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Abstract 
 
 
Increasingly, arbitration is becoming used to resolve bargaining disputes in a variety of 
settings.  Reducing dispute rates is often listed as a main goal in designing arbitration 
mechanisms.  Conventional arbitration and final-offer arbitration are two commonly used 
procedures, but theoretical examinations of these arbitration procedures show that disputants’ 
final bargaining positions do not converge and disagreement is likely.  This article contains 
results from a set of experiments designed to compare bargaining outcomes under the two 
commonly used arbitration procedures with outcomes under an innovative procedure called 
“double-offer” arbitration (Zeng et al. 1996).  This procedure requires that disputants make two 
final offers at impasse:  a primary and a secondary offer.  The arbitrator evaluates the pairs of 
offers using a linear criterion function, and theory suggests the secondary offers converge to the 
median of the arbitrator’s preferred settlement distribution.  Because the procedure’s rules are 
that convergence of offers generates a settlement at those offers, this theoretical convergence 
result implies that arbitration is not needed in the end.  Experimental results indicate that dispute 
rates in double-offer arbitration are, on average, about the same as dispute rates in conventional 
arbitration.  However, other results show reason to favor double-offer arbitration.  Specifically, 
in repeated bargaining, there is concern over whether use of an arbitration procedure becomes 
addictive and makes bargainers more likely to use the procedure in the future—a “narcotic 
effect.”  The data show that double-offer arbitration is non-addictive, whereas both conventional 
and final-offer arbitration are.    
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1.  Introduction 
 
 Arbitration is becoming increasingly used to resolve disputes and selectively replace 
trials for the litigation of certain civil disputes.  Its promulgation is due in large part to the 
savings on money and time costs it promises compared to litigation.  Arbitration is used to settle 
disputes in a variety of settings, though it is perhaps most apparent in resolving labor-
management disputes.  One could define a dispute as the lack of agreement in negotiations at a 
particular point in time (i.e., impasse), and the use of an arbitrator can at least guarantee an 
outcome.  The Supreme Court recently ruled that employers can require individuals to agree to 
arbitrate employment disputes even as a condition of employment, and so this increasing use of 
arbitration is likely to continue.1
 Existing research has examined the theoretical incentives of the types of arbitration rules 
used in practice (Crawford, 1979; Farber and Katz, 1979; Farber, 1980; Brams and Merrill, 
1983).  When disputants are uncertain about what settlement the arbitrator would prefer, then the 
zero-sum game incentives typically generate Nash equilibrium final bargaining positions that do 
not converge.  Convergence of final offers refers to when they are equal or have criss-crossed 
(that is, the buyer’s final offer is greater than or equal to the seller’s final offer), which implies 
that arbitration is no longer needed because the buyer’s willingness to pay is now at least as great 
as the seller’s willingness to accept.  The two most commonly practiced arbitration procedures 
are conventional arbitration and final-offer arbitration.  In conventional arbitration the arbitrator 
makes an unconstrained choice of an arbitrated settlement, whereas in final-offer arbitration the 
disputants each make a final offer and the arbitrator is constrained to choose one of these as the 
binding settlement.  Final-offer arbitration was suggested by Stevens (1966) as a way of 
conducting arbitration that might make voluntary settlement more likely, but theoretical and 
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empirical research has shown that this is not necessarily the case (see Farber, 1980; Brams and 
Merrill, 1983; Ashenfelter et al., 1992; Dickinson, 2004).  Since voluntarily negotiated 
settlements are generally considered superior to mandated settlements (see Crawford, 1979), any 
measure that can be introduced to promote more good faith negotiations and less reliance on 
third-party settlements can significantly improve dispute resolution both from an efficiency, as 
well as a cost, standpoint. 
The focus of this article is an innovative procedure developed in Zeng et al. (1996), 
called double-offer arbitration.  The rules of this procedure are such that disputants’ final offers 
are predicted to converge, thereby eliminating the actual use of the procedure.  This innovative 
procedure requires disputants to submit both a primary and a secondary final offer at impasse—
these are the “double” offers.  The primary offer is the disputant’s demanded outcome, and the 
secondary offer is the disputant’s estimate or “expectation” of the arbitrator’s desired outcome 
(i.e., the average arbitrator settlement preference).  Arbitrators evaluate the pair of final offers of 
each disputant and assign a value to the pair of final offers.  Specifics are given in the next 
section, but the procedure’s rules are such that, when arbitrators weigh a disputant’s estimate of 
the arbitrator’s settlement preference more than the disputant’s demanded outcome in evaluating 
the pair of final offers, secondary final offers will theoretically converge and arbitration is 
unnecessary—settlement is simply the converged secondary offers. 
Since double-offer arbitration promises to reduce (i.e., eliminate) disputes, an empirical 
examination of bargaining outcomes under this procedure is prudent.  This theoretical procedure 
is not used in practice, however, and so initial data is generated in a controlled laboratory setting.  
The results indicate that disputes are not eliminated under double-offer arbitration, but rather 
they are similar to average dispute rates under conventional arbitration.  In fact, when dispute 
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occurs, the innovative procedure may cause concern because it is shown, both theoretically and 
empirically, to cause final bargaining positions to diverge widely.  The concern is that certain 
arbitration procedures utilize one of the disputant’s final offers as the arbitrated settlement, and 
so extreme final offers imply extreme outcomes.  However, for the subset of rounds where 
disputants have common expectations about likely arbitration outcomes, the rule’s procedures 
guarantee no dispute.  This implies no need to ultimately invoke the procedure when bargainers 
are not “optimistic” about arbitrator settlement preferences.2  Finally, a probit estimation of 
dispute rates adding controls for arbitration history shows that both conventional and final-offer 
arbitration are addictive.  That is, previous use of either procedure increases the probability that 
disputants will use the procedure in the future.  Double-offer arbitration, however, is not 
addictive.  The absence of a “narcotic” effect, though not part of the formal theory, would benefit 
all disputants who might engage in repeated bargaining with a counterpart (e.g, grievance 
arbitration in unionized firms). 
2. The Double-Offer Arbitration Procedure 
 The reader is directed to Zeng et al. (1996) for a thorough theoretical examination of the 
double-offer arbitration procedures.  Here, I summarize the important features of the procedure, 
and the conditions under which the convergence results holds.  
Consider a buyer, b, and a seller, s, in dispute over the size of a variable x (e.g., the price 
in a transaction).  The buyer’s (seller’s) utility is decreasing (increasing) in the size of x.  The 
rules of double-offer arbitration require the submission of “double” final offers, a primary final 
offer, xi, and a secondary final offer, yi, from both the buyer and seller (i=b,s).  The arbitrator is 
assumed to have his own notion of a fair settlement, za, which is a draw from the density function 
f(.) describing the disputants’ uncertainty about arbitrator settlement preferences.  Assuming that 
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neither primary nor secondary final offers converge—if so the settlement would be the midpoint 
of the converged offers—the arbitrator proceeds to evaluate each disputant’s double offers with a 
linear criterion function Cs or Cb for the seller and buyer, respectively.  The lower criterion 
function value determines the arbitration “winner”, and the winner receives his primary offer as 
the binding arbitration settlement.  A lottery determines the winner in the event that Cs(.)=Cb(.). 
(1) Cs(xs,ys|za)=|ys-xs|+(1-)(ys-za) 
(2) Cb(xb,yb|za)=|yb-xb|+(1-)(za-yb) 
 The parameter (0,1) is determined by the arbitrator and is known a priori by the 
disputants.  Given the criterion functions (1) and (2), it can be noted that there are two ways in 
which a disputant can lower (i.e., improve) his criterion function value in making the double 
offer.  First, primary and secondary offers that are close will minimize the first portion of the 
criterion function for a given note the use of absolute values only in the first terms of (1) and 
(2).  Secondly, a secondary offer that is close to or even beyond the disputants’ belief of za will 
also lower the criterion function value.  Since we have described secondary offer yi as disputant 
i’s estimate of za, the second term of the criterion function rewards disputants who are unbiased 
(even pessimistic) about za.  Optimistic buyer (seller) beliefs would mean that yb (ys) is biased 
towards outcomes that are lower (higher), on average, than the true mean of the arbitrator 
settlement distribution, za.  While the secondary offer is a type of fair settlement estimate, the 
primary final offer can be described as the disputant’s real demand for x given that the winning 
disputant is granted his primary final offer as the binding settlement.  As summarized by Zeng et 
al. (1996) “…[i]n FOA [final-offer arbitration], the single offer of a disputant summarizes both 
his/her real demand and his/her estimate of a fair settlement.  However, estimate and demand are 
separate in DOA [double-offer arbitration].” (p. 150-1). 
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The key convergence result requires that the arbitrator places greater emphasis on 
secondary offers, or expectations, such that <.5.  In this case, Zeng et al. show that the unique 
global Nash equilibrium double offers are given by  
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where m is the median of the arbitrator settlement preference distribution, f(.).  In other words, 
the secondary offers of both disputants in (3) are m.  This secondary offer convergence implies 
automated settlement at the converged upon value, m in this case, under the procedure’s rules.   
For this range of parameters , the incentive for accurate expectations dominates the 
bargainer’s incentive to compromise between primary and secondary offers—see the criterion 
equation functions (1) and (2).  It is this incentive, which results from the specification of the 
criterion function, that theoretically induces both bargainers to submit the true median value of 
f(.) as the secondary offer.  So, in the end, arbitration is not used when final offers—in this case, 
the secondary offers—converge.  It is also worth noting that equilibrium primary offers in (3) 
diverge from m by the term 
)(2
1
mf
 , which implies increasingly divergent primary offers as  
approaches zero.  Though this should not matter since secondary offers theoretically converge 
for <.5, any small error in expectations accuracy for either bargainer might produce an extreme 
arbitration outcome given the predicted divergence in primary offers (one of which will be the 
arbitrated settlement under the procedure’s rules).  For the other range of parameters .5, Zeng 
et al. show that the unique local Nash equilibrium is one in which both primary and secondary 
offers are the same as in final-offer arbitration (i.e., no convergence). 
The potential value in double-offer arbitration lies in its ability to induce convergence of 
secondary offers to the median of the arbitrator settlement distribution when za estimates (i.e., 
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expectations) are emphasized.  An underlying assumption is that disputants have a common 
belief of za.  If beliefs are optimistic, disputants would then submit divergent secondary offers.  
However, recall that double-offer arbitration rewards non-optimistic expectations, because they 
lead to a smaller second term of the criterion function.  Therefore, an additional benefit of the 
procedure is that it may also help reduce disputant bias by making optimism costly.  This is 
significant given that biased expectations are often cited as a primary cause of bargaining 
impasse (Farber and Bazerman, 1989; Babcock and Loewenstein, 1997; Babcock et al., 1997).  
This innovative procedure internalizes expectations into its rules, and it is this feature that makes 
it potentially more attractive than some other innovative procedures that yield similar 
convergence results (e.g., the “combined” arbitration procedure of Brams and Merrill, 1986).  
Ultimately, of course, it is an empirical question whether or not disputes are reduced with 
double-offer arbitration, and so we next turn to an experimental examination of disputant 
behavior to answer this question. 
3.  The Experiments 
Subjects are randomly assigned a counterpart, and it is common knowledge that one 
bargains with the same counterpart for a twenty-round experiment.3  The experiment is run 
through computer terminals, and on-screen instructions are summarized by the experimenter.  
Win-loss bargaining over a variable, x, is induced by means of payoff tables.  Subject A (B) 
receives more money for lower (higher) values of x.  While each subject is aware of his own 
payoff table, and aware that bargaining is win-loss, payoff levels for different x-outcomes are 
private information.  Subjects exchange offers via the computer terminals and subjects have 2 
minutes to voluntarily agree (or not) upon a value of x.  The experimental bargaining 
environment is quite unstructured in the sense that there are no explicit rules that offers must 
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alternate, improve, or even that any offers be made during the bargaining round.  In the event 
that the round expires with no agreement, subjects are prompted to submit official final offers 
(double offers in the case of double-offer arbitration) and subjects then proceed to formal 
impasse resolution in the event that final offers do not either converge or criss-cross (i.e., Subject 
A final offer > Subject B final offer) to agreement. 
 There are four distinct impasse resolution procedures used in the twenty-round 
experiment.  Subjects bargain for five consecutive rounds under instructions outlining the use of 
each different procedure.  The impasse resolution procedures used include the three arbitration 
procedures, conventional, final-offer, and double-offer arbitration (with , and a benchmark 
“no arbitration” procedure that gives subjects a payoff of zero in the event of impasse.  Different 
subject groups proceed through the procedures in different orders.  Subjects are aware that the 
total number of rounds is twenty, but they are not ex ante aware that the rules of dispute 
resolution will change every five rounds.  In the event of impasse under any of the arbitration 
procedures, the procedure utilizes the subjects’ final offer(s), a random draw from the 
computerized arbitration distribution, f(x), and the rules of the procedure to determine a binding 
settlement of x for the round.  At the beginning of each conventional and final-offer arbitration 
round, each subject is asked to give his expectations of the likely draw from the computer 
arbitrator (i.e., the “computer decision-maker”) distribution.  Subjects are informed that their 
expectation from one of the rounds will be randomly chosen at the end of the experiment, and an 
additional $2 payoff will be given for an accurate expectation—an expectation within ten x-units 
above or below the true average of the computer decision-maker distribution, f(x).  Information 
on f(x) is given to each subject by means of a table of one-hundred past draws from the f(x) 
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distribution used in the experiment (a Normal (=60) distribution), following Ashenfelter 
et al. (1992).4  
 The use of arbitration has no monetary cost in these experiments.  Other researchers 
include explicit monetary costs of arbitration into their design (see Deck and Farmer, 2003; 
Pecorino and Van Boening, 2001).  This feature of the design makes it such that disputes should 
only exist if subjects differ in their risk preferences or expectations of arbitration outcomes.  
Asymmetric information on the computerized arbitrator is, in general, a potential additional 
source of dispute, but the design controls the information on the computerized arbitrator to be 
identical for all subject-pairs.  Though the addition of a monetary cost to arbitration is certainly 
more parallel to naturally occurring environments, this design focuses more exclusively on the 
role of “uncertainty” costs of arbitration in promoting voluntary settlements (as highlighted in 
Stevens, 1966). 
4.  Results 
 This section reports results of data generated from 52 subject pairs (i.e., N=1040 rounds 
of data).  The experiment lasted just under 1.5 hours, and average earnings for each individual 
subject were approximately $20.  The data are presented in summary form in Figures 1 and 2.  
Figure 1 shows dispute rates for each round of the experiment, averaged across all bargaining 
pairs.  One can see the downward trend in dispute rates that may indicate that subject learn over 
the course of the 20-round experiment.  The order in which subjects see different dispute 
resolution treatments is varied by experiment group, and so there may be trends across the five 
rounds of each treatment that are masked by the aggregation in Figure 1.5  Figure 2 shows 
dispute rates by treatment, averaged across all bargaining pairs for each round within the 
treatment.  Not only are the higher dispute rates for the arbitration treatments, relative to the no-
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arbitration (NA) treatment, apparent in Figure 2, but one can also identify a downward trend in 
dispute rates for the double-offer arbitration treatment.  This trend does not appear for the 
commonly used arbitration procedures, and this will be discussed further during the presentation 
of the Table 1 results (i.e., the models in columns (2) and (3) of Table 1). 
The main statistical analysis of the data is shown in Table 1.  A random effects probit 
model is used to estimate the probability of dispute under the assumption that subject pairs in the 
experiment represent a random sample of a larger population of bargaining pairs.  The random 
effects estimation controls for interpair heterogeneity in the data and also the potential non-
independence of error terms across rounds for a given subject pair.6  Three models are estimated:  
column (1) of Table 1 shows results from a basic treatment effects modeling of dispute rates, 
while columns (2) and (3), also include controls for bargaining experience of the subject pairs.  
In column (2) of Table 1 we include variables controlling for cumulative experience in the 
bargaining environment (Round) and experience utilizing each distinct arbitration procedure (the 
History variables).  The model in column (3) in Table 4 also includes variables controlling for 
the number of no-dispute or settlement rounds for each treatment the subject-pair has 
accumulated up to the present round.  The difference between these final two models is that the 
column (3) can distinguish any behavioral difference between subject pairs who have utilized a 
given arbitration procedure the exact same number of times, but one of the pairs has voluntarily 
settled more (or less times) within that treatment.  That is, this model explicitly distinguished 
between good (voluntary settlement) and bad (dispute) bargaining experience within each 
treatment. 
 The marginal effects shown in column (1) of Table 1 indicate that, relative to the no-
arbitration treatment, all arbitration procedures significantly increase the probability of dispute.  
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This is consistent with Ashenfelter et al. (1992), among others, and it is not surprising given that 
the arbitration procedures in this experiment lower the cost of dispute relative to the zero-payoff 
treatment.  Also consistent with existing laboratory research, it is estimated that dispute rates are 
marginally higher in final-offer than in conventional arbitration (Ashenfelter, et al., 1992; 
Dickinson, 2004; Deck and Farmer, 2003).  It is also apparent from Table 1 that dispute rates are 
not significantly improved overall by the use of double-offer arbitration.  The marginal increase 
in the probability of dispute, relative to no-arbitration, is significantly lower in double-offer and 
conventional arbitration than in final-offer arbitration (p=.00 and p=.02, respectively, for the 
Wald test of the restriction).  However, there is no significant difference in the estimated 
marginal effects of double-offer and conventional arbitration (p=.62).  Expectations are a critical 
factor in comparing the success of any arbitration procedure since real world negotiators may 
have biased estimates of impasse outcomes (see Babcock et al., 1993; Babcock et al., 1996).  So, 
prior to discussing the remaining Table 1 results in columns (2) and (3), I first discuss some 
additional results that stem from exploring the role of optimism in the data generation process. 
 A more detailed look at dispute rates is accomplished by dividing the data into optimistic 
and non-optimistic sub samples—non-optimistic includes pessimistic pairs as well as unbiased 
pairs.  The data coding on expectations is at the pair level.  Pairwise optimism indicates that the 
subject B (seller) expectations minus subject A (buyer) expectations are greater than zero.  For 
example, if subject A, subject B beliefs of [350,480], [495,510], and [550,675] for likely 
outcomes from arbitration would all be coded as “pairwise optimism”.  Given the structure of the 
no-arbitration and double-offer arbitration treatments, expectations are not elicited at the 
beginning of the bargaining rounds.  For expectations of f(x) in double-offer arbitration, 
secondary final offers are somewhat comparable to expectations elicited at the beginning of the 
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rounds in conventional and final-offer procedures.  When eliciting expectations in conventional 
and final-offer arbitration, recall that subjects have a monetary incentive to be accurate.  
Specifically, subjects are informed that one round is drawn at random from the conventional and 
final-offer arbitration rounds at the end of the experiment, and $2 is added to their compensation 
if the expectation recorded for that round is accurate.7  The main differences are that secondary 
final offers are never obtained when subjects reach agreement during the course of the round 
and, when they are obtained, it is at the end rather than the beginning of the round.  In the no-
arbitration treatment, expectations are not elicited at all since the zero payoff of impasse is 
known with certainty.  These details of the data set and data comparability across treatments 
render the statistical analysis less than straightforward, but the general picture of how optimism 
affects disputes in the different arbitration procedures is still quite clear.  
For those bargaining pairs that have some degree of optimistic expectations in a given 
round a dummy variable is coded equal to one for pairwise optimism in that round.  This is true 
of about 81% of the sample of observations in the arbitration treatments.  For double-offer 
arbitration, we only code as optimistic those pairs who reach the end of the round so that we 
have data on optimistic secondary offers.  Table 2 shows results in column (1) from a random 
effects probit model that indicates that the probability of dispute is statistically significantly 
increased by 48% when the bargaining pair is optimistic about f(x), consistent with comparable 
laboratory evidence in Dickinson (2004).  This does not, however, estimate a differential effect 
across arbitration treatments.  The model in column (2) of Table 2 instead includes two variables 
interacting pairwise optimism with conventional and final-offer arbitration.8  These results now 
indicate that optimism increases disputes by slightly more in final-offer than in conventional 
arbitration, although the effects are statistically insignificant.  Given this, it is clear that most of 
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the decrease in probability of dispute for nonoptimistic pairs comes from the double-offer 
arbitration treatment.  The results in Table 2 reflect the fact that the double-offer arbitration rules 
dictate a settlement for non-optimistic pairs.  This makes the optimism results from column (1) 
seem a bit less informative, but the general optimism result is consistent with existing research.   
One drawback from the double-offer arbitration procedure is that when secondary offers 
do not converge, the arbitrated settlement is one of the disputant’s primary offers.  Theory 
predicts these to diverge more than final offers in final-offer arbitration when <.5 (see equation 
(3)), and so outcomes will be more extreme and potentially less acceptable if the procedure does 
not work as expected.  Looking at the subset of disputed rounds in both these procedures, we 
find that final offers of buyer and seller diverge by 129.9 units in final-offer and by 181.3 units in 
double-offer arbitration.  As predicted, arbitrated settlements are more extreme in double-offer 
arbitration when secondary offers do not converge, regardless of the reason for non-convergence.
As for dispute rates, the most commonly used metric for success of dispute resolution 
procedures, the conclusion is somewhat mixed for the innovative arbitration procedure.  Dispute 
rates are not that different between conventional and double-offer arbitration, which is contrary 
to the theoretical convergence prediction of double-offer arbitration.  On the other hand, the 
theoretical prediction assumes unbiased beliefs, and the majority of the subject pairs are 
optimistic.  When measuring expectations in the experiment, if we assume that secondary offers 
are comparable to expectations elicited in final-offer and conventional arbitration, then double-
offer arbitration reduces disputes to zero for unbiased and pessimistic bargaining pairs.  This is 
not surprising since the procedure forces settlement when secondary offers converge, but the 
resulting settlement is still likely to be more acceptable overall than the alternative arbitrated 
settlement that would give one disputant his primary offer.  In comparison, for unbiased and 
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pessimistic pairs in the other arbitration treatments, disputes still occur about 15% of the time.  
The fact that double-arbitration procedure completely avoids arbitrated outcomes for non-
optimistic disputants may seem uninformative given the procedure’s rules.  Nevertheless, these 
rules reward non-optimistic disputants and allow them to avoid the arbitration procedure in the 
end.  The risk of the procedure is that non-convergence of secondary offers (e.g., a slight error or 
bias in expectations) implies even more extreme arbitrated settlements than in final-offer 
arbitration. 
Double-Offer Arbitration:  non-habit-forming? 
 Dispute rates are the most readily measurable and widely used statistic to assess the 
effectiveness of dispute resolution procedures in general.  However, much has also been said 
about the so-called “narcotic” effect, which states that arbitration may become addictive and 
replace good-faith efforts by disputants to negotiate voluntary settlements.  In long-term 
relationships and potential repeated bargaining situations, such as grievance arbitration in labor-
management relations, the potential for disputants to become addicted to arbitrated settlements 
can be a significant concern.  Bolton and Katok (1998) study the narcotic effect in repeated 
laboratory bargaining and find that learning is slowed by arbitration.  Their result illuminates 
some of the mixed evidence that had been found from field studies that examine the narcotic 
effect of arbitration but ignore the impact of learning over time.  A more heavy reliance on 
arbitration over time would merely worsen the concerns of having lower quality or less efficient 
outcomes via the arbitrator.   
 The repeated negotiations environment reported in this article lends itself to examining 
the possibility of a narcotic effect for each of the distinct arbitration procedures.  I take a classic 
interpretation of the narcotic effect—the probability of dispute in the current round being 
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positively related to the extent to which the arbitration procedure has already been used (see 
Butler and Ehrenberg, 1981)—along with learning effect insights from Bolton and Katok (1998) 
to examine this issue in the current data.  Specifically, general learning is examined with a 
variable, Round=1-20, which provides a measure of experience in lab negotiations for each 
subject pair.  Along with this variable, I include four separate arbitration history variables, NA 
History, CA History, FOA History, and DOA History, that measure the cumulative prior use of 
each separate dispute resolution procedure within its treatment rounds.  As such the History 
variables can each take on values 0-4 within each treatment given that there are 5 rounds per 
treatment.  Similar to the procedure in Bolton and Katok (1998), there are controls for both 
learning from bargaining outcomes (the History variables) as well as general experience learning 
(Round), though I separate “outcomes learning” for each of the four dispute resolution 
treatments.9 
 Even with these controls for learning, it may still be the case that two bargaining pairs 
with a given amount of bad history (i.e., dispute) within any particular arbitration treatment may 
behave differently if their “good” history differs within the treatment (i.e., voluntary settlement 
rounds).  The round variable does not distinguish between such good and bad history, and it is 
not treatment specific.  As such, four additional variables are introduced—the Settlement History 
variables—to capture any behavioral differences of this type.10  These variables will also take on 
values from 0-4. 
 Column (2) of Table 1 shows random effects probit estimates of the treatment effects 
along with the controls for arbitration use history and general learning.  The estimated marginal 
effect on general learning, as captured by Round, indicates that subjects are significantly less 
likely to dispute the more experience they gain in their lab negotiations (6% less likely to dispute 
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for each 10 rounds of experience).  This indicates that the bargaining subjects learn from 
experience, as also noted in Bolton and Katok (1998).11  In the present data, there is no real 
evidence that a subject pair’s probability of dispute is negatively related to previous disputes 
within the no-arbitration treatment.  The point-estimate of the marginal effect on NA is negative, 
but it is statistically insignificant.  On the other hand, the commonly used forms of arbitration, 
conventional and final-offer arbitration, show evidence of a narcotic effect.  Each additional 
round in which a subject pair has previously utilized one of these procedures to settle a dispute 
increases the probability of dispute in the current round of that specific treatment by 7%-9%, 
independent of any general learning across rounds.  This is evidence in support of a narcotic 
effect hypothesis for arbitration, and the estimated marginal effects also indicate that a round of 
dispute in conventional or final-offer arbitration offsets more than ten rounds of general lab 
bargaining experience.  In sum, bargainers show evidence of habit formation in the commonly 
used arbitration procedures, and the negative effects of this vastly outweigh the positive learning 
trend in the data. 
 The narcotic effect is, however, curiously absent for double-offer arbitration.  The 
estimated marginal effect of DOA History on the probability of dispute is statistically no 
different than zero.  This is a significant finding that distinguishes this innovative procedure from 
the commonly used arbitration procedures.  Of course, the narcotic effect is an important 
empirical phenomenon that theoretical examinations of arbitration procedures typically ignore.  
Some speculation would be that double-offer arbitration is non-addictive because of the way in 
which disputants are forced to review their beliefs about arbitrator preferences and impasse 
outcomes.  Even though the average subject remains optimistic with respect to arbitrator 
preferences, the exercise of formulating double offers involves more reflection on both demand 
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and expectations than one finds in commonly used arbitration.  It is this exercise that may help 
sever the link between current round behavior and past history of double-offer arbitration use.  
As hypothesized by Bolton and Katok (1998), “…[i]t is not apparent to us that outside party 
intervention need slow bargaining learner.” (p. 29).  This seems to be the case for double-offer 
arbitration in repeated bargaining situations. 
 Finally, the model in column (3) of Table 1 includes controls for both bad and good 
treatment-specific learning.  Results are largely similar to the column (2), with the exception of 
the coefficient on DOA Settlement History.  The marginal effect on this coefficient indicates that 
there is a decrease in the probability of dispute under double-offer arbitration of 10% for each 
additional round of voluntary settlement history under this procedure.  So, not only does there 
appear to be no narcotic effect of double-offer arbitration, but the results indicate that the more 
subjects utilize the procedure, the less they are likely to use it in the future. 
5.  Conclusion 
 This article provides a first source of data on an innovative arbitration procedure called 
double-offer arbitration.  The motivation for exploring bargainer behavior under this procedure is 
that it possesses a theoretical property of convergence of secondary offers, which is sufficient to 
generate agreement under the procedure and avoid the need to invoke arbitration.  The prospect 
of increasing voluntarily negotiated settlements relative to the commonly used conventional and 
final-offer arbitration procedures is of significant interest.  Not only do lower dispute rates imply 
cost savings from a lesser need to utilize the arbitration institution, but arbitrated settlements are 
also considered of lower quality and potentially less efficient than negotiated settlements 
(Crawford, 1979; Farber, 1980).  In addition to examining dispute rates, final bargaining 
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positions and evidence of potential addiction to arbitration (i.e., narcotic effects) are also 
reported.  These represent different outcome dimensions for comparing arbitration procedures. 
 Repeated bargaining experiments allow subject-pairs to engage in win-loss bargaining 
under the distinct arbitration procedures of conventional, final-offer, and double-offer arbitration.  
A pure treatment effects empirical model shows that the probability of dispute in double-offer 
arbitration is not significantly different from that in conventional arbitration, though both are 
lower than the dispute probability in final-offer arbitration.  The lack of support for the 
theoretical prediction of reduced disputes is likely due to the average subject optimism in the 
data.  When controls are added for subject beliefs, double-offer arbitration works exactly as 
predicted, not surprisingly.  This is by design because secondary offers in this procedure are 
essentially the subject estimates of the likely arbitrator preference for the disputed variable x.  
When subjects are unbiased, these estimates converge and when the arbitrator weighs the 
estimates more than subject demands in evaluating each individual’s pair of final offers, 
theoretical secondary offers are precisely these unbiased estimates.  Convergence of secondary 
offers generates an automated settlement as per the rules of the procedure, and so double-offer 
arbitration guarantees settlement for the subset of unbiased subjects.  This may seem to 
creatively force subjects to agreement, but subjects have complete liberty in submitting double 
offers and so the result is incentive-based and it rewards good (i.e., accurate) expectations.   
Even if one believes that secondary offers are not perfectly correlated with beliefs in 
double-offer arbitration, less optimistic bargaining pairs have been shown to dispute less 
frequently across different arbitration procedures (see Dickinson, 2003), though the present data 
on this procedure would be more difficult to interpret without a reliable measure of expectations.  
A drawback of the procedure is that arbitrated settlements are more extreme when secondary 
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offers do not converge.  So, optimism not only increases the likelihood of dispute, but it also 
implies that arbitrated settlements are more extreme under the innovative procedure than under 
final-offer arbitration.  This may be a concern since extreme settlements is a commonly noted 
criticism of final-offer arbitration (see Farber, 1980).  
 An interesting finding in support of double-offer arbitration is that it does not generate 
the narcotic effect that is found in the commonly used arbitration procedures.  Independent of the 
general learning trend that lowers dispute probability over time, past arbitration experience in 
conventional or final-offer arbitration significantly increases the probability of dispute in the 
current bargaining round.  This is not so with double-offer arbitration and, in fact, there is 
estimated to be an opposite effect whereby a history of voluntary settlement under double-offer 
arbitration decreases the likelihood that the procedure will be utilized in future rounds.  Though 
the mechanism by which habit formation occurs is not well understood in the context of 
arbitration, I speculate that this procedure is not addictive because of the way in which 
bargainers are forced to reflect more in making the more complicated double offers than in 
making the singular final offers elicited in the commonly used procedures.  Perhaps this makes 
the procedure seem less like a lottery to the subjects, which makes them less likely to base 
current decisions on past outcomes.  Whatever the mechanism, the effect is robust to 
econometric estimation techniques and may even imply that any arbitration procedure can be 
improved by eliciting subject expectations and promoting reflection on the likely arbitrated 
outcomes. 
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FIGURE 1:  Average Dispute Rates By Round
(dispute rate for each round averaged over all bargaining pairs over all treatments)
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TABLE 1 
 
Dispute rate treatment effects 
Random effects probit modeling of dispute=0,1 (N=1040)                                  
 
 
 
Variable 
(1) 
Marginal effect 
p-value 
(2) 
Marginal effect 
p-value 
(3) 
Marginal effect 
p-value 
Constant -.28 (.00)*** -.20 (.02)** -.26 (.01)*** 
CA .36 (.00)*** .27 (.00)*** .35 (.00)*** 
FOA .44 (.00)*** .32 (.00)*** .42 (.00)*** 
DOA .34 (.00)*** .31 (.00)*** .45 (.00)*** 
Round --- -.006 (.01)*** -.005 (.10)* 
NA History --- -.02 (.67) -.02 (.76) 
CA History --- .07 (.03)** .07 (.04)** 
FOA History --- .09 (.01)*** .09 (.02)** 
DOA History --- .006 (.82) -.002 (.93) 
NA # settlements --- --- .03 (.42) 
CA # settlements --- --- -.04 (.30) 
FOA # settlements --- --- -.06 (.24) 
DOA # settlements --- --- -.10 (.02)** 
% correctly predicted 64% 66% 69% 
Log likelihood function -582.7 -571.46 -563.84      
 
*,**,*** indicates significance at the .10, .05, and .01 level, respectively. 
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TABLE 2 
Dispute rate effects of optimism 
Random effects probit modeling of dispute=0,1 (N=1040) 
                                              
 
 
Variable 
(1) 
Marginal effect 
(p-value) 
(2) 
Marginal effect 
(p-value) 
Constant -.28 (.00)*** -.28 (.00)*** 
CA -.02 (.78) .28 (.00)*** 
FOA .07 (.27) .34 (.00)*** 
DOA .08 (.22) .34 (.00)*** 
Optimistic Pair .48 (.00)*** --- 
Optimistic Pair*FOA --- .13 (.19) 
Optimistic Pair*CA --- .10 (.20) 
% correctly predicted 76% 65% 
Log likelihood function -571.49 -580.10 
 24
Author Affiliation 
 Department of Economics 
 Appalachian State University  
 
Acknowledgements 
The author thanks NSF for funding this research through grant SES-0133231.  Partial funding 
was also granted by the Agricultural Experiment Station at Utah State University.  This paper has 
benefited from communication with Dao-Zhi Zeng and the comments of two anonymous 
reviewers.  The author is grateful to Kamalakar Thota, Pablo F. Rego Barros, Jianlin Cheng, 
Jujun Zhang, and Stacie Gomm for programming the computerized bargaining environment.  
The author also thanks Nitesh Saha for valuable research support. 
 
NOTES 
                                                 
1 The Supreme Court Case is Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 99-1379. 
2 In the context of this paper, optimism is defined for the bargaining pair and refers to the 
situation where the seller (Player B) expects an arbitrated settlement that is larger than what is 
expected by the buyer (Player A). 
3 The experimental instructions are available upon request.  This same basic experimental 
bargaining environment is also used in Dickinson (2004), which compares conventional, final-
offer, and “combined” arbitration.  Combined arbitration is yet another innovative theoretical 
arbitration procedure that is not used in practice, but that possesses nice theoretical properties.  In 
the present paper, expectations are elicited in conventional and final-offer arbitration, which was 
not the case in Dickinson (2004).  The expectations data allow one to evaluate the extent to 
which optimism may be affecting bargaining outcomes. 
4 Since subjects bargain over an abstract variable, x, they are given a suggested bargaining range 
in their instructions.  This bargaining range is also highlighted on each individual’s payoff sheet, 
but the center of subject A’s suggested bargaining range (x=450) is not the same as the center of 
subject B’s (x=550).  This may increase overall disputes but, since the same bargaining ranges 
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are used in all 4 treatments, comparisons of outcomes for a given subject pair across treatments 
can still identify treatment effects.   
5 There were six experimental groups in total, and the order of the treatments for each group 
were:  (CA,NA,DOA,FOA), (DOA,CA,FOA,NA), (FOA,DOA,NA,CA), (NA,FOA,CA,DOA), 
(CA,FOA,DOA,NA), (DOA,FOA,NA,CA). 
6 Random effects is considered appropriate for this probit model given that the parameter 
estimating the degree of interdependence of the error term across rounds for a given subject pair 
is statistically significant (p<.10).  Nevertheless, comparable linear models were estimated and 
there are no major differences in key results of such estimations compared to the random effects 
probit estimations.  Results are available upon request.   
7 Here, “accurate” is specifically defined for the subjects as an expectation of the average x from 
the “computer decision-maker” (i.e., arbitrator) that is within 10 units above or below the actual 
average of the arbitrator distribution.  This gives subjects a 1/3 standard deviation window for 
accuracy given the arbitration distribution utilized—normal (. 
8 Optimism is not interacted with double-offer arbitration due to the rules of the procedure.  
These rules, and the fact that we utilize secondary offers as our indicator of expectations in this 
treatment, imply that optimistic pairs will be forced to utilize arbitration (i.e., this would 
perfectly predict disputes) 
9 Bolton and Katok (1998) introduce a slightly different modeling of round versus outcome (i.e., 
disputes or settlements) in analyzing their data—the concern is potential multicollinearity of 
round and outcomes variables.  I do not follow their exact same procedure primarily because 
multicollinearity of Round and the History variables is less a concern in the present data, where 
each dispute resolution treatment makes up only one-fourth of the total number of rounds for 
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each bargaining pair.  Also, none of the coefficient estimates from the nonlinear probit models 
presented in Table 1 are sensitive to the use of the random effects probit estimator versus the 
appropriate linear modeling (i.e., fixed or random effects) of the data.  Coefficient estimates from 
the linear models are virtually identical in magnitude and statistical significance to those from 
the probit estimates.  In sum, the key narcotic effect results are not a function of the estimation 
technique used.  These results are available from the author on request. 
10 The author thanks an anonymous reviewer for suggesting these control variables. 
11 They report that subjects learn from the mistake of dispute.  However, it is not clear that 
disputes are best characterized as mistakes since they may be inherently strategic in repeated 
negotiations. 
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